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Foreword 
Influenza pandemics are events that have occurred in the past and will undoubtedly occur in the 
future.  There is uncertainty about when the next influenza pandemic will occur, who will be most 
impacted, and how many will fall victim to this viral disease.  These uncertainties make 
communicating the risk and consequences of pandemic influenza a greater communication 
challenge than the usual public health threats.   
 
The Pandemic Influenza—Past, Present, and Future Workshop looked at the impact of the 1918–
1919 influenza pandemic from the perspective of family life, local communities, and societal and 
governmental perspectives in an attempt to use the lessons of the past to help prepare for the 
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Executive Summary 
On October 17, 2006, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of the 
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs (ASPA) and the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases presented a 
historical retrospective review of the impact of the 1918–1919 influenza pandemic. A panel of 
experts convened to discuss how the 1918–1919 pandemic affected daily life in the United States 
and what lessons can be learned and applied to planning today.   
 
The goals of the meeting were to:   
• provide participants with a frame of reference and historical background on the 
1918–1919 influenza pandemic,  
• identify contemporary pandemic influenza issues and questions, and  
• present guidance for the development of communication materials and messages that 
can be used in the event of an influenza pandemic. 
 
Historical perspectives were provided during the day-long meeting by a panel of renowned 
experts and historians. The panelists reviewed literature and “fugitive data” (data that is not 
commonly cited). They also analyzed themes and issues that arose during the 1918–1919 
influenza pandemic that are relevant to current pandemic communication planning efforts. The 
themes and issues covered fell under three broad questions: 
1. How did the 1918–1919 influenza pandemic affect family life? 
2. How did the 1918–1919 influenza pandemic affect local communities? 
3. How did the government respond and society adjust to disruptions caused by the 1918–
1919 influenza pandemic? 
Workshop participants were federal, state, and local public health personnel.  They discussed 
presentations made by the expert panel and generated questions they thought likely to be asked by 
the public during an influenza pandemic. 
 
The panelists included: 
• John M. Barry: Mr. Barry is a prize-winning and New York Times best-selling author 
with recognized expertise in an unusual variety of areas, including infectious disease, 
rivers, crisis management, and the media. Mr. Barry is a member of several advisory 
boards, including the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health and a federal 
government Infectious Disease Board of Experts. He has served as an advisor to federal 
and state agencies, as well as World Health Organization (WHO) officials. 
• Richard Hatchett: Dr. Hatchett is the Associate Director for Radiation Countermeasures 
Research and Emergency Preparedness at the National Institute for Allergy and 
Infectious Diseases (NIAID). Dr. Hatchett previously served as a Senior Medical Adviser 
for the HHS Office of Public Health Emergency Preparedness (OPHEP), and as Director 
for Biodefense Policy for the White House Homeland Security Council. Since March 
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mitigation strategy and has coordinated interagency modeling efforts to test the strategy 
under consideration. 
• Howard Markel: Dr. Markel is the Director of the Center for the History of Medicine at 
the University of Michigan; the George E. Wantz, M.D. Distinguished Professor of the 
History of Medicine; and a Professor of Pediatrics and Communicable Diseases, Medical 
History, Health Management and Policy, and Psychiatry. Dr. Markel has or currently sits 
on several editorial and executive boards of scholarly publications and academic 
societies. He is also a Fellow of the American Academy of Pediatrics, an elected member 
of the American Pediatrics Society and the Society for Pediatric Research, and a member 
of the American Association for the History of Medicine.  
 
These Proceedings provide a summary of the Pandemic Influenza—Past, Present, Future 
Workshop: Communicating Today Based on the Lessons from the 1918–1919 Influenza 
Pandemic. Speakers’ remarks were summarized from notes taken at the workshop and notes 
provided to the editors. The workshop agenda, a resource list, summaries of probable stakeholder 




Pandemic Influenza—Past, Present, Future Workshop 
 
 3 October 17, 2006 
Morning Session  
Charge to Group  
Alan Janssen, Health Communication Specialist, U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services  
Alan Janssen welcomed approximately 100 attendees to the workshop. Mr. Janssen described the 
goals and objectives of the workshop and encouraged all the attendees to take an active role in 
helping to generate questions to assist with future pandemic event communication activities. He 
introduced Suzy DeFrancis, ASPA, and Dr. Bruce Gellin, National Vaccine Program Office 
(NVPO) prior to their providing opening remarks and comments. Dr. Richard Tardif, Oak Ridge 
Institute for Science and Education (ORISE), was also introduced as the moderator for the 
workshop activities. 
Welcome and Opening Remarks  
Suzy DeFrancis, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Office of the Secretary, U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services 
John Barry is required reading at HHS headquarters. He has sold a lot of books and has spoken a 
number of times to senior staff. Congratulations to all of you for being here, because it is what we 
do beforehand that is important when a disaster strikes. This is why President Bush launched the 
national strategy for responding to an influenza pandemic. All government agencies are working 
hard to implement the strategy.  
 
HHS has a leadership role in many of these implementation activities. Therefore, Secretary 
Leavitt went all over the country to conduct pandemic flu summits to “kick-off” planning efforts 
at the state and local level. This was quite an undertaking, as he conducted 50 state summits in 
three months! The goal of the summits was to encourage planning at all levels of government 
throughout the country.  
 
One of the things the Secretary has recognized is that communication is as important as any other 
part of the response. Communication has been referred to as the “social Tamiflu.” We at HHS 
recognize that if an influenza pandemic occurs, we will be the first generation to be faced with the 
additional demands of the 24-hour news cycle. Therefore, we must inform, but not inflame.  
 
We have been working on a number of tools in order to meet today’s communication challenges: 
• Our government-wide Web site, www.pandemicflu.gov, is being translated into other 
languages. We are constantly adding to it and updating it as well. We have recently 
added new planning checklists with assistance from CDC. 
• We have provided risk communication training around the country (by CDC). This is 
very useful because we have continued building relationships through the process. 
• We have conducted audience research and message testing. 
• We are working on outreach, especially to the most vulnerable populations. We are 
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• We met with members of the media, including network executives, and gave them a 
“Pandemic 101” overview. It was very well-received and those who attended 
mentioned that they (the media) want to be responsible, but the “blogs” are going to 
push them. This led us to convene a conference call with the “bloggers,” and we 
discovered that they are a tough audience. 
• We are looking at embedding HHS public affairs and subject matter experts (SMEs) 
within the media to help get the right information out. 
• We are developing a large video library because we know that many pictures the 
public sees are frightening. We are working on media images that help the public 
better understand the “whole picture.” 
• We are conducting a series of five exercises across the country with the media. We 
will have more information on that later in January, 2007.  
• We are collaborating with international partners to gather lessons learned. 
• We are working on Public Service Announcements (PSAs) now, to tell people where 
they can get information and what they can do about pandemic flu. 
 
Today’s workshop will help us understand what communication was like during the 1918 
pandemic so that we can apply lessons learned from history to today’s planning efforts. I expect 
this to be a very thought-provoking session. 
Opening Comments 
Bruce Gellin, Director, National Vaccine Program Office (NVPO) 
I went to the bookstore recently and did a search on pandemic publications—71 titles that came 
up in that search. Amazing. Influenza pandemics have occurred in the past and certainly will 
occur in the future, but still there are a number of uncertainties that make it more difficult to 
ommunicate the risks. Today’s panelists will be presenting their own research efforts.  c
 
We are going to be learning from the lessons of the past and coming up with critical questions 
about the future. Today is not about trying to reach a consensus, but rather trying to come up with 
the critical questions that we need to consider. I encourage all of you to ask questions of the 
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The Effects on Society at Large 
John Barry, Historian and Author 
Quote: “What we learn from history is that we do not learn anything from history,” George 
Bernard Shaw.  
 
Numbers: No one really knows how many people died, but the first contemporary estimates put 
deaths at 21 million worldwide. That estimate is often still quoted, but it was certainly far worse 
than that. MacFarlane Burnett spent much of his life studying influenza, and he concluded that 
the worldwide death toll (from the 1918–1919 pandemic) was a minimum of 50 million, possibly 
100 million. He may well have been right.  
 
If you adjust for population, that could be 300 million today. In three weeks, it killed more people 
than AIDS has in 24 years. In the U.S., a reasonable estimate starts at 500,000 deaths. Personally, 
I am inclined toward a higher estimate of 700,000.  
 
There was 15–53% morbidity. In San Antonio, over 90% of households had at least one family 
member with the illness. Most of the deaths occurred in healthy adults. In Army camps, the death 
toll was routinely over 5%, sometimes as much as 10%, and in some communities as high as 
30%.  
 
A human face: One physician at Camp Devens outside Boston wrote a colleague:  
 
“These men start with what appears to be an ordinary attack of LaGrippe or 
Influenza, BUT when brought to the Hosp. they very rapidly develop the most 
vicious type of Pneumonia that has ever been seen.  SOON YOU see the 
Cyanosis extending from their ears and spreading all over the face, until it is hard 
to distinguish the coloured men from the white.”  
 
“It is only a matter of a few hours then until death comes... It is horrible. One can 
stand it to see one, two or twenty men die, but to see these poor devils dropping 
like flies... We have been averaging about 100 deaths per day... Pneumonia 
means in about all cases death... It takes special trains to carry away the dead. For 
several days there were no coffins and the bodies piled up something fierce. It 
beats any sight they ever had in France after a battle... Good By old Pal, God be 
with you till we meet again.”  
 
That letter reflected the typical experience in 1918 army camps. It was sure that these men would 
end up in death. It was a horrible sight to look upon because the cyanosis was such that most 
physicians had never seen it before. 
 
A big problem was you never knew if you were going to have the lethal kind, or normal flu. 
Regardless, it was gruesome. There were many with broken ribs from violent coughs. Air pockets 
also formed outside the lungs, and when you’d move these people it would sound like popping 
bubble wrap. Nose bleeds were common, less common was bleeding from mouth, and even 
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In 1957 during the Asian Flu pandemic, 25% of all deaths were directly from viral pneumonia. In 
1918, there were probably more than that. Antibiotics, while useful, are not necessarily a solution 
if the cause of pneumonia is viral. 
 
There were enough anecdotal reports from reliable observers that prove some deaths were 
extraordinarily rapid, occurring in 24 hours or less. While most, even from acute respiratory 
distress symptoms, would succumb four to six days after their first symptoms, for others death 
would occur in two to three weeks. 
 
Context: We were at war. It was the first total war. It was the first time the government tried to 
fully control the public. The pandemic was known as Spanish flu, but we know it did not start in 
Spain. It was called Spanish Flu because Spain was not at war, so there was a free press. Most of 
Europe had a censored press. The U.S. press was more open, but still the new Sedition Act was 
passed. This was a law that made the Patriot Act look like it was written by the ACLU (American 
Civil Liberties Union).  
 
To enforce the law, the Justice Department issued badges to the “American Protective League” 
(APL), who was identified as Secret Service. Within a year, the attorney general said 200,000 
APL members were operating in 1,000 communities.  
 
In Chicago, a “flying squad” of league members and police trailed, harassed, and beat members 
of the International Workers of the World (IWW). In Arizona, league members and vigilantes 
locked 1,200 IWW members and their “collaborators” into box cars and left them on a siding 
across the state line in the New Mexico desert. Throughout the country, the league's American 
Vigilance Patrol targeted “seditious street oratory,” sometimes calling upon the police to arrest 
speakers for disorderly conduct, sometimes acting more directly. Everywhere, the league spied on 
neighbors, investigated “slackers” and “food hoarders,” and demanded to know why people didn't 
buy—or didn't buy more—liberty bonds. 
 
At the same time, states outlawed the teaching of German. In Providence, Rhode Island, the 
Providence Journal carried a banner warning that “every German or Austrian in the United States 
unless known by years of association should be treated as a spy.” The problem was that the single 
largest ethnic group in the United States was German. 1918 was a time when there was a well-run 
propaganda machine.  The government created the Committee for Public Information (CPI). It 
was intended to create one white-hot mass of determination. A quote by Arthur Bullard (who 
directed the CPI's Russian Division) summarizes the tenets of propaganda at the time, “Truth and 
falsehood are arbitrary terms... There is nothing in experience to tell us that one is always 
preferable to the other... There are lifeless truths and vital lies... The force of an idea lies in its 
inspirational value. It matters very little if it is true or false.”  
 
Part of the propaganda machine included the energetic direction of Mississippi newspaper editor 
George Creel, an advisor to President Wilson. Under Creel, the CPI churned out national 
propaganda through diverse media. Creel organized the “Four-Minute Men,” a virtual army of 
volunteers who gave brief speeches wherever they could get an audience. There were 150,000 of 
the Four-Minute Men, who would propagandize for “four minutes” prior to any kind of public 
gathering. These men were charged with creating fear in the population because it was “an 




Pandemic Influenza—Past, Present, Future Workshop 
 
 7 October 17, 2006 
only on the highest ethical plain. To fight for an ideal, perhaps, must be coupled with thoughts of 
self-preservation.”  
 
There was intimidation that was enforced by the law; in fact a U.S. Congressman went to jail for 
15 years for violating the law. Several journalists and editors were jailed too. 
 
The 1918–1919 influenza pandemic swept across the U.S. during a time when patriotism was 
more important than truth. Thus, intimidation and propaganda were part of the communication 
culture. 
 
A pandemic meets the propaganda machine: During this time at least 25% of doctors and 
nurses were in the military. Additionally, national, local, and state officials all operated in the 
same way. At best, they communicated half-truths, or even out-right lies. As terrifying as the 
disease was, the officials made it more terrifying by making little of it, and they often 
underplayed it. Local officials said things like “if normal precautions are taken, there is nothing to 
fear” but then they would close all businesses. 
 
“Worry kills more people than the disease itself,” a Chicago public health official was quoted as 
saying. Other quotes were: “Don’t get scared,” and “The so-called Spanish influenza is nothing 
more or less than old fashioned grippe.”  
 
Communication was rarely honest, because honesty would hurt morale. One of the first 
newspapers that started telling the truth in Milwaukee saw its editor jailed, so they stopped telling 
the truth. In Philadelphia, after a public health official finally closed all public gatherings and 
public funerals, the newspaper said, “This is not a public health measure.” 
 
There was a lot of cognitive dissonance. People heard from authorities and newspapers that 
everything was going fine, but at the same time, bodies were piling up. Imagine your spouse lying 
dead in bed for six to eight days. There were coffin shortages. The dead were piled up where they 
died. There were police going around asking people to “bring out their dead.”  
 
Panic was incipient. Even if there was war, the war was removed from us. The fear was so great 
that people were afraid to leave home or talk to one another. Everyone was holding their breath, 
almost afraid to breathe, for fear of getting sick. 
 
Army camps were shut down. People didn’t want to let soldiers return home. People were afraid 
to have any intimacy with their community and loved ones. Nobody would bring food in or come 
to visit.  
 
In the hills of Kentucky, there were hundreds of cases. People were panic stricken and many were 
starving, not even for lack of food, but for fear of going near each other. 
 
In Phoenix, a rumor started that dogs carried influenza, and people were shooting their pets. 
They’d give their pets to the police to kill them, because they couldn’t kill them themselves. 
 
At that time, the economy was controlled. The national government did little to help. The Public 
Health Service (PHS) was given $1 million, but did next to nothing and ended up returning most 
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There were four groups (local charitable organizations) that did help. This was actually the 
American Red Cross’ “golden age.” At that time, Red Cross groups were headed by people of 
great prominence. They begged people to come in to volunteer. They took out a paid half-page 
advertisement that said: “The safety of this country demands that all patriotic available nurses, 
nurses' aids [sic] or anyone with experience in nursing place themselves at once under the 
disposal of the Government... Graduate nurses, undergraduates, nurses' aids, and volunteers are 
urged to telegraph collect at once... to their local Red Cross chapter or Red Cross headquarters, 
Washington, D.C.”  
 
Liberty Loan groups were in communities trying to help. This was one extraordinarily organized 
group. They had a “captain” for every block and every large apartment building. Other private 
sector organizations were horizontally integrated so that everyone talked to each other. In many 
ways, it was better than today. 
 
Despite these efforts, absenteeism remained a problem. At the L.H. Shattuck Company, 45.9% of 
the workers stayed home. At the George A. Gilchrist shipyard 54.3% stayed home. At Freeport 
Shipbuilding 57% stayed home. At Groton Iron Works 58.3% stayed home. Even in an industry 
that was crucial to the war effort, absenteeism was high. Fear and terror was akin to the Black 
Plague. An internal American Red Cross report concluded, “A fear and panic of the influenza, 
akin to the terror of the Middle Ages regarding the Black Plague, [has] been prevalent in many 
parts of the country.” 
 
One report noted that not a single automobile was moving on the street in Manhattan. In 
Philadelphia, a medical student was able to count cars on the way in and said the city was dead. It 
seemed at the time like civilization could easily disappear from the face of the earth. 
 
Is this an over-statement of how the pandemic affected our country? Probably; there was one 
woman I met who had no recollection of the pandemic. However, it is important to note that 
society worked better in places where authorities told the truth. San Francisco was an example. In 
San Francisco authorities took out advertisements that said: “Wear a mask and save your life.” 
Masks probably didn’t help, but people trusted government more and they organized to feed 
people. San Francisco just seemed to keep operating better. 
 
In 1918, Departments of Public Health were often referred to as Departments of Public 
Assurance.  
 
Take away message: False reassurance is the worst thing you can do. Don’t withhold 
information, because people will think you know more. Tell the truth— don’t manage the truth. If 
you don’t know something, say why you don’t know, and say what you need to do to know. Drown 
people with the truth, rather than withhold it. 
Panel Discussion 
Richard Hatchett: 
• The previous speaker set the context well. It is important to understand that it was a 
special time in our history. WWI was at a crisis. It wasn’t clear that the war was 
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• earlier. 
• g about it when it was far away, but went silent when deaths 
• The attitude of authorities was: “This isn’t happening, don’t worry about it.” 
se, 




ous. There is not, however, a lot of 
• 
• At that time it was the equivalent of “9-11” happening every day. For example, 
assassination attempts against Lenin were on page 12, ahead of this story…the Czar 
had been executed.  
• The pressure to maintain the war effort made so many other things lose importance. 
• The overall case fatality rates were extremely high in younger populations. 
Background fatality rates for children were quite different than today. 
• 1918 case fatality rates in one-to-four year-olds is equivalent to what it would take 
now for 15–16 years of fatalities. This relates to a huge surge. It is unfathomable, 
really. 
• Public messaging: Disease was so widespread, nothing good would result from 
public action. Fear was more fearsome to the officials than the disease.  
• By the time they closed schools in Baltimore, it was too late. It was important to do 
something about it, right away (e.g., need to not have a lag at all in taking action). 
• To put this in perspective, the median time between onset and time of death was eight 
to 10 days. Additionally, the interpretation of data was delayed. 
• Remember that at that time, nothing was done to interfere with public morale. 
 
John Barry: 
• Many times public health officials knew the truth but did not tell it. This was the case 
in Philadelphia. 
 Boston had already exploded in chaos several weeks 
• In many cases they were just plain lying. 
• Newspapers were pretty much unbelievably bad sources. 
Newspapers were writin
came to their own city. 
Questions from the Audience 
Q: A significant amount of data show that pregnant women died disproportionately. Of cour
back then many wo
 
che t) There was certainly an additional strain on pregnancy. 
Maternal mortality rates peaked in 1918 with 916 per 100,000 births. That means one
per 1,000 births. The multiplying factor is enorm
specific data about pregnancy during that time. 
We’ve run several flu exercises to look at a number of different issues, including 
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o 
 
s of engagement for behavior, so we miss 
• ith 
 
t sets of rules in the case of 
treatment protocols, including those for pregnancy. 
t 
 
t being too 
onservative. I can’t emphasize enough how much you need to get out in front of it. 
 that even 
necdotally there would be better outcomes in places that had better communication?  
ated and isolated that the society 
breaks d
•  should look at the nonpharmaceutical interventions and emphasize them 
•  to determine if the risk communication provided 
. In 
e 
tsburgh. In Pittsburgh, the Mayor actually told the public to ignore the public health officials.  
:
alize, 
ecause morbidity and mortality rates varied so much from community to community. 
 data on physician and nurse deaths. However, I too wouldn’t 
be surprised if it wasn’t over 50%. 
 
we have run scenarios from crisis to Katrina-like problems. In all of these exercises a 
key issue has been “transparent communication.” Today, we have the opportunity t
frame how the public perceives what is happening. What seems to be the problem
early on is they aren’t able to shift rule
opportunities to act until it is too late. 
Today, I think, as opposed to back in 1918, we don’t have as much of a problem w
misinformation as the lack of transparent information. We also have a situation in
which institutions will need to operate under differen
 
A: (Barry) I want to emphasize that it is not likely that public health officials would tell outrigh
lies. However, it is just as important not to hold back information. I was just at an exercise last 
week and a public health official said, “The last thing I want to do is have a press conference.”
This is the wrong approach. You really need to get out in front right away. For example, you 
could get out and say we know it is in the Orient, but we don’t know if this individual is the first 
case, so we need to start getting ready right now. Don’t wait. We need to worry abou
c
 
Q: While there were no definite countermeasures known to be effective, could you say
a
 
A: (Barry) The key is trust. It is when people feel totally alien
own. Telling the truth is what held society together. 
Today we
early on. 
There is a lot of work being done
actually improved social issues. 
 
A: (Hatchett) There is a tremendous amount of wishful thinking that the virus won’t come here. 
In 1918 the shaping of the cognitive environment varied dramatically from location to location
some places elected officials and public officials locked arms on some things. Some tentativ
evidence shows that social distancing interventions did help. However, Baltimore is a case 
example of how to do it wrong (e.g., not close the schools). In Baltimore there were fights 
between elected officials and public health officials. Another example of doing it wrong was 
Pit
 
Q  Can you expand on the issue of mortality and morbidity for healthcare workers? 
 
A: (Barry) There is no definitive data. I can say that often death notices for doctors and nurses 
showed up in tiny print in the newspapers. In many places the rates were high; morbidity over 
50%. Logic suggests that social distancing measures helped, but I am not convinced that those 
interventions had an effect that was anything more than random. One can’t really gener
b
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hese audience-generated questions and issues can be found in 
Appendix D of this document. 
 
ency Preparedness at the National Institute for Allergy and Infectious 
t, particularly in an 




hange. What may work in one time and place may not work in another.  
ases 
us 
ar. This could be applied to creating strategies of approach for planning 
r a pandemic today. 
mple, deriving generalizations from a close reading of the historic record 
is benef
• on plan of action, conflicts may 
• information in a timely fashion during difficult 
• etter for political leaders to be truthful rather than minimize what is happening; 
 
Exercise: Note cards were turned in from audience members to collect thoughts and concerns 
from the group. A summary of t
The Effects of Infrastructure and Government 
Dr. Richard Hatchett, Associate Director for Radiation Countermeasures Research
and Emerg
Diseases  
Note about the speaker: While most people are involved in preparing for a pandemic in one 
capacity or another, Dr. Hatchett has devoted the last five years to public health emergency 
preparedness and a considerable amount of attention to disease containmen
en
  
Navy midshipmen learning example:  In Trafalgar, Lord Nelson was outnumbered and 
outgunned, so he split his fleet and came alongside the French and Spanish line to achieve
comparative advantage because his ships were much more maneuverable. In doing so, he 
destroyed the French and Spanish fleet. Although he died in battle, he achieved through tactics 
and maneuvers what he could not achieve through brute force. This can be applied to our cont
today for our analysis of 1918. Context is important because environment 
c
 
Another military example: General Grant advanced on Vicksburg very quickly. In Virginia, he 
developed a completely different strategy…to grind down Lee’s Army. He used totally different 
strategies in each campaign because he was in completely different environments. In both c
he faced foes with different sets of preoccupations. The point is that Grant understood his 
opponents. He devised the correct strategy for each campaign. He did not try to fight the previo
battle of Vicksburg in Virginia. Fighting the previous war is often a good recipe for disaster if 
used to fight the next w
fo
 
To take what was done in 1918 and apply that to today is to learn to deal with handling a 
pandemic in our environment and communities. Historical perspective is critical for deriving 
plans for today. For exa
icial because:  
• a poorly mitigated pandemic will overwhelm medical resources; 
in the absence of prior planning and an agreed up
emerge that may retard the emergency response; 
figuring out ways to gathering 
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• public health leaders need to realize that you can’t make everyone happy in a 
Another e ay be whether or not 
schools  a series of other questions:  
ce? 
es 
Today,  h ritical infrastructure and interdependency 
between the structures than our gran
• eloped notion of public health and medical infrastructure, and 
 which have been eroded over the last several 
 
How th 9
n-time delivery of key resources and materials. 
cascading firewalls.  
not occur in 1918. So, while the October draft was 





 qu stion that policy makers will want answered from history m
should be closed. Framed in the 1918 experience, that leads to
• Is there evidence that closing schools made a differen
• Is the timing of school closings important? 
• If it made a difference in 1918, would it make a difference today, given the chang
in demographics?  
 
we ave a much more developed sense of c
dparents did. Our grandparents: 
• had a clear concept of the war effort, 
• knew what industries fit into the war effort, 
had a dev
• had more advanced local level concepts,
decades. 
e 1 18 pandemic affected infrastructure: 
• Infrastructure was less complex than today. 
• There was less dependence on just-i
• There were more natural firewalls, as opposed to 
• National power grids did not exist. 
• Americans were not dependent upon foreign oil. 
• Food distribution was more extended. 
• Communities were more self-sufficient and more insulated from each other.  
 
Today, extended networks create the potential for cascading failures, but also increase the 
resiliency for critical infrastructure against local failures. Today, we should not focus on the 
critical first weeks; instead, we should focus on the aggregate effect over time.  
 
It is important to note that sectoral failures did 
p
continued. The war effort continued even when New York City reported a 40% decline in 
productivity in shipyards on October 18th.  
 
Los Angeles introduced interventions during the first few weeks of the epidemic, much earlier 
than New York, so they did not suffer the types of problems New York experienced. Baltimore 
newspapers published appeals to the public to minimize the use of telephones, but even a
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e 
rk City transit use, the Dow Jones, and business failures were 
indiscernible and modest when compared to the volatility of the period. Because of the short 




• every community.  
mps 
• widely missed because 
e 
s to 3 weeks.  
s very 
anufacturer of street 
s. That wouldn’t 
day due to specialization.  






d to do a good job of managing messages to 
o organize human behavior and maintain public 
 
. 
How many people in their prime actually died? 
They estimated absenteeism averaged about 5% over a two-month period, not quite double th
normal average. Absenteeism peeked on October 22. However, the aggregate impact of 
absenteeism was significantly reduced. Economic impacts were modest, below 5%, when 
averaged out. A major recession did not ensue. Retail sales did decline in October, but they 
rebounded in November. New Yo
duration of the pandemi
only produced brief slow
 D scussion 
rr :  
Courts did not meet in 
• It is important to understand how quickly the pandemic moved in military ca
(two and a half weeks) and in the civilian community (five to six weeks). The peak 
was a matter of days.  
There were three waves in 1918. The first wave was 
symptoms were mild, with little complications (four deaths). The second wave cam
six months after the first wave was noticed, and it was lethal. It rolled across the 
country and around the world in 8 day
• Communication was very important in terms of the first wave. Adequate attention 
was not paid regarding the complexity the first wave represented. A first wave i
complicated in terms of messaging.  
• Communities were more resilient in 1918. In Philadelphia, a m
cars was asked to make coffins when the city ran out of coffin
happen to
• The econ
• Dependence on transportation is enormously different today. 
 H tchett: 
The velocity of the 1918 pandemic did not compare with those in 1957 and 1968
The 1918 pandemic moved much faster through communities.  
• It is important to understand all pandemics are different. In 1918, cities that were 
comparatively successful in mitigating the first wave were pressured to relax 
interventions. When relaxed, cities experienced that it never really went away
• The key is early implementation of all interventions; however, once implemente
trigger has been pulled, and cities neede
keep the public on board.  
• It is tricky for communities t
compliance. 
Questions from the Audience 
Q: It has been a fascinating discussion about sectoral value. It is surprising that there would be so
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rtality was 0.4%, which implies a case fatality rate of 1.75 to 2.0% and 
ere was a cumulative morbidity of 18–20%. Although a lot of deaths were in the productive 
ell. Estimates would be about 0.2% for 
e general population. 
: (Barry) Richard [Hatchett], was talking systematically about structure. There were not a lot of 
nction.  
 in 
oking at connectivity of major urban 
enters to estimate how infectious diseases would spread now. In recent work looking at real 
 
s. I do not believe the potential benefits 
utweigh the clear negative impacts of shutting down the borders…the economic impacts would 
or a relatively short period of time. 
the 
on how to handle influenza. As 
pposed to privately stockpiling antivirals, creating liberal leave policies would be more useful. 
 
ore rapidly a resistant strain will 
merge. It may help some, but we don’t know how much. It is not a magic bullet that many 
ally believe that H5N1 will be the next pandemic; 
aving said that, yes, I do have a personal cache of Tamiflu. 
 
 
A: (Hatchett) Excess mo
th
population, there were children and seniors who died as w
th
 
Q: In terms of not affecting government, how is that so? 
 
A
government functions in 1918, and there was a more robust public health system. While many 
courts did close down, police departments did continue to fu
 
Q: In terms of transportation, communities were isolated from each other in 1918. Now we don’t 
have that. Have any prospective pieces of work been done? 
 
A: (Hatchett) Cities were more isolated from each other. The pattern of the spread of the virus
1918 was related to troop movements. There has been a considerable amount of work on 
modeling from Department of Transportation (DOT) lo
c
world data, the geographic diffusion process is driven more by work-related travel. The ability to
make definitive statements will be limited by caveats. 
 
A: (Barry): Remember, we don’t need airplanes to spread influenza. Work is being done on the 
impact of border crossings to delay entry by two week
o
be significant. Look at the impact of SARS [Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome]. It was pretty 
intense, but only f
 
Q: What is your idea of community members and businesses purchasing antiviral doses? Is it 
role of business? 
 
A: (Hatchett) CDC and HHS have been engaging businesses 
o
Some companies (privately held) have made the decision that it is in their best interest to keep
employees with sick family members out of the work place.  
 
A: (Barry) Keep in mind that the H5N1 virus can become resistant to Tamiflu, especially the 
more it is used as a prophylactic. The more this happens, the m
e
people would hope it to be. I do not person
h
 
Q: Is there a Plan B aside from Tamiflu? 
 
A: (Barry) I have heard that Relenza may be better as a prophylactic. I know that there is a lot of
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a 
we’re doing will serve us. 
 
Exercise: Note cards were turned in from audience members to collect thoughts and concerns 
from the group. A summary of these audience-generated questions and issues can be found in 
Appendix D of this document.
Q: There is a tremendous emphasis on preparedness for pandemic influenza, but there seems to 
be the potential for a wide range of other public health emergencies. Do we risk public 
confidence if the next public pandemic is different? 
 
A: (Hatchett) Certain aspects of pandemic preparedness are specific to an influenza threat, but 
lot of what we’re doing has the potential for broad application. In terms of dealing with a 
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• 
ans. This must have had an 
• 
d there 
• t far 
 it 
could have been perceived that the closure meant the bank did not have funds.  
Afternoon Session 
The Effects on Individual and Family Life  
Dr. Howard Markel, Director of the Center for the History of Medicine at the 
University of Michigan 
This is not one overarching story, but thousands of stories with separate outcomes. It is difficult 
to concisely answer the question of how all Americans attempted to protect themselves and what 
this global disaster meant, in human and scientific terms. Record keeping in 1918 was vastly 
different compared to this era. This is a tale of many cities, towns, and hamlets, multiplied by all 
kinds of individual experiences. Looking at American society in 1918, it was a very different 
country compared to today, with 50% of Americans living in rural settings. We need to be 
familiar with the social, cultural, and economic history of the region of study and try to 
understand the differences and similarities.  
 
Differences between 1918 and today: Some of the striking differences between 1918 and today 
include: 
• The train was the rapid form of transportation.  
• The telegraph and telephone were the rapid forms of communication. 
• Less than 50% of the population was city dwelling. 
• There was a different kind of 24-hour news cycle; at that time there were as many as 
two to five daily newspapers. 
• People wanted and needed their news information from written sources. 
• There was a wide spectrum of quality among health agencies. 
• The legal understanding of privacy, and civil and constitutional rights was different. 
• Mass vaccination programs have changed. Public support and trust of these measures 
and medical professionals have changed, especially in regard to vaccines.  
• As far as the political landscape of 1918 goes, the majority of Americans had 
different views of federal and local government in their lives.  
Civics or Government courses have left the high school curricula. At that time, these 
were routinely drummed into the heads of young Americ
impact on what people thought of their responsibilities.  
Daily commercial transactions were different: there were no supermarkets, 
refrigeration was primitive, there was a limited supply of preserved foods, an
was daily market-going activity at multiple locations (e.g., grocer, butcher). 
Finance: there were no credit cards or personal checking accounts, which mean
more frequent visits to the bank. In 1918, there was almost exclusively a cash 
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• Nonpharmaceutical interventions included closures of schools and public parades. 
Banks would have been one of the last institutions to close, and of course, saloons 
were the very last institutions to close. 
Modern developments: Today our modes of travel and communication have changed: 
• We have a high volume of commercial aviation, instead of mass transit such as 
railways and steamships.  
• There is immediate access to the Internet and personal computers. 
• We have advances in medical technology and therapeutics that have changed the 
landscape of how to approach a pandemic.  
• Connectivity means many financial transactions can be done from home.  
However, America’s least wealthy still have the most difficulty getting access to these things. 
hose with the most limited resources are often hardest hit by natural disasters or pandemics.  T
 
The greatest differences between 1918 and today are the state of medical care and the role of 
hospitals. In the early 1920’s, even the best of medical centers or hospitals amounted to basic 
nursing care. Intravenous fluids and mechanical ventilators were not available. Many other 
facilities were makeshift institutions. Gyms, school halls, or armories were commandeered to set 
up cots, which would never be the case today. When the flu crisis was over, very little was done 
to rectify problems in basic health care that were identified during the crisis.  
 
Physical experience: The “flu” term is overused. Many people say they have the “flu” when 
really it is a common cold or virus. “Stomach flu” is really overused. Influenza A or B is not 
subtle. Symptoms include high fever, muscle aches, hacking cough. Postviral symptoms include 
continued difficulty in breathing and painful chest wall muscles. The word influenza has its 
origins in fifteenth-century Italy, where the cause of the disease was ascribed to unfavorable 
astrological influences. An evolution in medical thought led to its modification to influenza di 
reddo, meaning “influence of the cold.”  f
 
As bad as a bout of real seasonal influenza is, the H1 strain was far worse. It killed two percent or 
more of those stricken. In 1918, postmortem examinations helped understand if it was a case of 
flu. The performance of those autopsies was harrowing. Influenza defiled the lungs with bloody, 
frothy fluid. Instead of floating, the lungs plummeted to the bottom of water buckets during 
autopsies. The bronchials were fluid-filled, which explains the air hunger patients experienced. 
They frequently died from suffocation within 24–48 hours of developing symptoms. Some died 
ater from secondary infections.  l
 
Psychological effects: Youngsters were sent away from homes because they were either sick and 
required isolation, or were well and needed to be protected from those sick in their household. 
Some were isolated from the outside world in orphanages. Newspapers carried long lists of the 
ead, with only names and dates of death.  d
 
Literature: There are very few biographies of famous people who contracted influenza. An 
example includes F. Scott Fitzgerald. He contracted influenza and was disappointed that it caused 
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Thomas Wolfe wrote a literary masterpiece about the death of his brother. More fabled is how 
influenza altered the decision-making abilities of President Woodrow Wilson and his chief aide, 
Colonel Edward House. Both were in Europe to attend the Paris Peace Conferences—the famed 
gathering where Wilson hoped to sell his 14 Points and establish a League of Nations. Colonel 
House, who arrived in Europe just weeks before the Armistice, contracted a severe bout of flu as 
he was negotiating with the other nations. In late February, as he was recuperating from his 
serious illness, Colonel House noted that, “When I fell ill in January, I lost the thread of affairs 
and I am not sure that I have ever gotten fully back.” To make matters worse, when Wilson was 
in Paris in mid-March, to work with the Big Four in the final stages of a comprehensive peace 
treaty, he, too, was stricken by influenza. Volumes have been written on how influenza may have 
altered the terms and negotiations of the Treaty of Versailles as it ravaged the bodies and thoughts 
of Woodrow Wilson and Edward House, among others.  
 
While social historians of medicine warn against focusing too heavily on the illnesses of great 
men or the landmark cures of great doctors, the fact remains that when a world leader is struck 
down by influenza, in the midst of a pandemic that is accompanied by other global crises, the 
microbes’ power can be amplified above and beyond the symptoms it produces or the death it 
causes. 
 
A masterpiece: In another case, influenza had the power to create a literary masterpiece through 
the experience and pen of a brilliant writer named Kathryn Ann Porter. At the time of the 
pandemic, Porter found herself in Denver as a newspaper reporter for the Rocky Mountain News. 
Both Porter and her Army lieutenant lover contracted the flu. Porter’s case was dire and her death 
seemed certain. Porter recovered months later only to learn that the love of her life died.  
 
Almost twenty years later, she published one of the most eloquent descriptions of how flu tore 
family life asunder—through the eyes and emotions of a young girl named Miranda. Her 
magisterial novella, Pale Horse, Pale Rider, should be required reading for all who wish to know 
something about the social impact and personal impact of contagious disease; it also serves as a 
remarkably accurate description of what life was like in the U.S. during 1918. In the novella, 
Miranda makes a harrowing recovery from her grave illness, thanks to the attentive care of her 
nurses and physicians, only to learn (as Porter discovered in real life) that her new-found love, 
Adam, died of influenza at the camp hospital. Yet in a wonderfully optimistic declaration, 
Porter’s alter-ego, Miranda, concludes: 
 
“No more war, no more plague, only the dazed silence that follows the ceasing of 
the heavy guns; noiseless houses with the shades drawn, empty streets, the dead 
cold of tomorrow. Now there would be time for everything.” 
 
Conclusion: Like Porter’s Miranda, I remain ever hopeful that there will be time for 
everything—including productive, ethical, and socially appropriate strategies that mitigate the 
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Panel Discussion 
Richard Hatchett: 
Wide array of public health agencies: There is concern in the policy making arena about the 
attempt to develop guidance. Local public health agencies may not realize the degree of support 
they could receive from the public health community. The challenge is to think of ways to 
mobilize pillars of support so that communities don’t feel that they are making profound 
decisions alone, absent of input from other institutions that will be there to support them. Whether 
or not we are prepared for the next pandemic, we are better positioned. We have tremendous 
mechanisms in the absence of direct face-to-face contact, so we must figure out how to take 
advantage of ways to stay connected. Even while disconnected, there is opportunity to mitigate. 
One way we begin to understand the psychosocial impacts is when we consider the impact of 
dozens of deaths in a single school.  
 
Howard Markel: 
Death issue: In 1918, the childhood mortality rate for children under five-years-old was one in 
five. Every household knew of a child who died at a very young age, often of a contagious 
disease or dehydration issues. Back then, the care of the ill was almost exclusively at home. 
Today, death has been taken out of the household. Very few people have seen someone die today. 
In 1918, it was probably 90%. Death issues need to be talked about. For example, what should we 
do if public gatherings for funerals are cancelled? How will that affect people? There are social 
effects of quarantine, although now we have some resources to mitigate the effects. Public health 
departments (municipal, state, and federal) are all funded very differently. Post 9-11, bioterrorism 
preparedness efforts have been good for public health, because they are not mutually exclusive 
problems. Whether man-made or ecological, the strategies we need to use to address these 
problems are not that different.  
 
John Barry: 
There are two great tragedies: The death of a child, or the death of a young child’s parent. 
Society saw a lot of both in 1918. There were many orphans in 1918. Several states put together 
orphan trains for adoption stops, which led to the establishment of the Child Welfare Department. 
I recently attended a tabletop exercise that included faith-based organizations. They can barely 
maintain the current agenda and feel that it would be almost impossible to take on additional tasks 
due to lack of resources. A problem we have is that volunteers are often double-counted. Plus, 
they may also be sick in the event of a pandemic. We need to think hard about parallel 
organizations that need help. 
 
Howard Markel: 
In talking with those in the front lines about potential problems down the road, the response is 
typically that they are very busy right now. This brings up a broader issue of the risk that people 
may tune out if a threat never does occur. Since we can’t say when a pandemic will happen, there 




Pandemic Influenza—Past, Present, Future Workshop 
 
 20 October 17, 2006 
Questions from the Audience 
Q: Thoughts on the public—we are expecting more from government. Will people be less patient 
and expect more than they did in 1918? 
 
A: (Barry) The public does expect a lot more, and we expect technology to solve everything. I am 
appalled by the lack of attention paid to influenza in preceding decades. We have spent more on 
West Nile than influenza, which will never be as serious a threat. I believe that technology will 
eventually solve influenza. There has been enough work done to demonstrate that it is probable 
that we will have a vaccine that works for all influenza viruses. In general, people are not as self-
sufficient as they used to be. The lack of flexibility today is a problem. We expect structures to do 
more for us and take care of us more than people did back then. 
 
A: (Hatchett) It is true that people expect quite a bit from government. People have an affinity for 
magic bullets and an immediate vaccine. It is unfortunate that the single most effective 
intervention that people can take is individual action. This requires a tremendous imperative for 
government and public health authorities to communicate information effectively. It is critical 
that if we are to coordinate efforts to reduce transmission, people must take responsibility for 
their own actions and for their families. Individuals can reduce their own risk, and this must be a 
large component of our planning. 
 
A: (Markel) Medical communities have a vested interest in pushing medicine. It is critical to 
understand what we have, what we can do, and what we hope to do. 
 
Q: It is an unfair question about maintaining trust when it may be impossible to do. You spoke on 
the importance of truth-telling for maintaining trust. When the message is “we do not have 
enough masks” or “you are not the priority person for antivirals,” clearly, most human beings 
who hear that message will not trust because they don’t like the answer. What do you think can 
be done to maintain trust in that kind of situation? 
 
A: (Hatchett) That is a powerful question. There is certainly concern about rationing medical 
resources. This became clear early on in our planning efforts. This situation would fracture public 
trust. The driving concern over the last year has been to look at the overall strategy and think 
about any conceivable way to sufficiently reduce transmission so that we can push the need to 
prioritize off the table. We plan to act aggressively in a coordinated fashion, using all available 
tools to reduce the degree of transmission so rationing does not need to be applied. This has not 
been done before. However, there is accumulating evidence from a variety of sources (historical, 
epidemiological studies, modeling studies) that we may be able to suppress transmission 
significantly.  
 
A: (Markel) It is essential to be honest: say what you know and don’t know. The American 
people can handle that and do so all the time. There is a real difference between the political and 
medical worlds. In the political world, we are rewarded for staying on message. In the medical 
world, plans change depending on symptoms; we are always working with incomplete data sets. 
We are willing to change our minds as we get more information, and that is good medicine. This 
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A: (Barry) The need for rationing should be explained within the community. People are 
accepting when reasons for prioritizing are good. Nonsensical rationing cannot be explained, and 
we need to think hard about whether or not to do so. 
 
Q: Regarding policy, is there going to be a federal policy that will be consistent across the 
nation? What can we do to have a consistent message? 
 
A: (Markel) Looking at the broad history of public health, diseases are not a local phenomena and 
they don’t know boundaries or care about arbitrary states or jurisdictional lines. However, public 
health mechanisms in the U.S. are based on local incidences and phenomena. We need a global 
health department and standard criteria for how to manage disease outbreaks. It is a flaw that we 
rely on local and state health departments for protocols and policing.  
 
A: (Hatchett) Local public health officials would welcome specific actionable guidance. HHS is 
working hard to develop guidance that can be released. At the federal level we recognize that 
issuing general guidelines has value and would be helpful. 
 
 
Exercise: Note cards were turned in from audience members to collect thoughts and concerns 
from the group. A summary of these audience-generated questions and issues can be found in 
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Closing Remarks 
Event host, Alan Janssen, thanked the attendees for participating in the historic review. He 
appreciated the hard questions that were asked and thanked the panelists for their expertise. He 
closed by stating that principles don’t change in risk communication, but reasons why we do 
things do. He cautioned the need to tell the truth; we need not be afraid to say we don’t know; and 
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Appendix A: Agenda 
 
Pandemic Influenza—Past, Present, Future 
Communicating Today Based on the Lessons from the  
1918–1919 Influenza Pandemic 
 





9:00 – 9:30 Welcome and Opening Remarks—Suzy DeFrancis, Assistant Secretary 
of Public Affairs, Office of the Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services 
  
 Opening Comments and Charge to Group—Alan Janssen, Health 
Communication Specialist, U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
 Moderator—Dick Tardif, Senior Scientist, Oak Ridge Institute for 
Science and Education 
 
9:30 – 10:00  John M. Barry, The Effects on Society at Large 
 
10:00 – 10:10  Panel Discussion 
 
10:10 – 10:25   Moderated Q&A session with the panel 
 
10:25 – 10:30  Exercise—Generate Questions  
 
10:30 – 10:45  Break 
 
10:45 – 11:15 Dr. Richard Hatchett, The Effects on Infrastructure and Government 
 
11:15 – 11:25  Panel Discussion 
 
11:25 – 11:40  Moderated Q&A session with the panel 
 
11:40 – 11:45  Exercise—Generate Questions  
 
11:45 – 12:00  Summary 
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AFTERNOON SESSION 
 
1:00 – 1:15  Welcome Back 
 
1:15 – 1:45  Dr. Howard Markel, The Effects on Individual and Family Life 
 
1:45 – 2:00  Panel Discussion 
 
2:00 – 2:15  Break 
 
2:15 – 2:55  Moderated Q&A session with the panel 
 
2:55 – 3:00  Exercise—Generate Questions  
 
3:00 – 3:30 Closing Remarks—Alan Janssen, Health Communication Specialist, U.S. 
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Appendix B: List of Historical Resources 
Books 
 
Flu: The Story of the Great Influenza Pandemic of 1918 and the Search for the Virus that 
Caused It  
• Author: Gina Kolata 
• Publisher: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, November 1999 
• ISBN 0743203984  
Kolata uses personal stories, modern research, and medical descriptions to depict the devastation 
caused by the 1918-1919 influenza pandemic. Kolata posits that identifying the causes of the 
1918 epidemic is the only way to prepare for and prevent future ones. This book is a 1999 New 
York Times notable book. 
 
When Germs Travel: Six Major Epidemics That Invaded America Since 1900 and 
the Fears They Have Unleashed  
• Author: Howard Markel 
• Publisher: New York, Pantheon Books/Alfred A. Knopf Books, 2004. 
(Simultaneously published in Canada: Toronto: Random House of Canada, Ltd., 
2004; paperback edition published by Vintage Books/Random House, New York, 
2005.) 
• ISBN: 978-0-375-72602-6 (0-375-72602-0) 
Markel discusses six epidemics—tuberculosis, bubonic plague, trachoma, typhus, cholera, and 
AIDS—and offers insight into the American public health system. The book identifies 
weaknesses in the system, and calls for a globally funded public health system aimed at stopping 
he spread of epidemics.  t
 
The Great Influenza: The Epic Story of the Deadliest Plague in History  
• Author: John Barry 
• Publisher: Penguin Books, 2005 
• ISBN: 0143034480 
Barry delves into the history of the 1918 influenza pandemic. He presents statistics and personal 
ccounts that illustrate the emotions of the time and offers his suggestions for the future.  a
 
Secret Agents: The Menace of Emerging Infections  
•
 Press, 2005 
• ISBN: 0309076382 
 Author: Madeline Drexler 
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Drexler addresses new and emerging infections, and chronicles the achievements of science in the 
race to prevent future epidemics. Topics include foodborne pathogens, antibiotic resistance, 
animals and insectborne diseases, pandemic influenza, infectious causes of chronic disease, and 
bioterrorism. 
 
Plagues and Poxes: The Impact of Human History  
• Author: A.J. Bollet 
• Publisher: Demos Medical Publishing, 2005 
• ISBN: 188879979X 
This series of essays focuses on the history of diseases. The book includes discussions of 
containment and treatment, as well as advances made in the medical community.  
 
Rapid Reference to Influenza, 2nd edition  
• Author: Jan Wilschut, Janet Mcelhaney, Abraham Palache 
• Publisher: Mosby, June 2, 2006 
• ISBN: 0723434336 
A clearly written, illustrated reference guide, Rapid Reference provides detailed information on 
influenza— its origin, symptoms, and treatment. The 2nd edition includes an updated section on 
the H5N1 virus.  
America's Forgotten Pandemic: The Influenza of 1918
• Author: Alfred Crosby 
• Publisher: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989 
• ISBN: 0521833949 
Crosby provides a comprehensive account of the 1918–1919 influenza pandemic that measures 
the impact on American society. Crosby also questions the lack of interest in the pandemic, 
aintaining that the keys to the future lie hidden in this forgotten pandemic.  m
 
Influenza 1918  
•
• ISBN: 157500108X 
e focus 
of the book lies not in medical or scientific thought, but rather in individual experience.  
Purple Death: The Mysterious Flu of 1918 
 Author: Lynette Izzoni 
• Publisher: TV Books, March 1999 
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t and Co. (BYR), November 15, 2000 
iscusses the rapid spread and morbidity rates. Included are photographs that help depict the 
e.  
The Gr  
• Author: David Getz 
• Publisher: Henry Hol
• ISBN: 080505751X 
Getz focuses on the medical history of the influenza pandemic of 1918. This historical account 
d
seriousness of the diseas
 
eat Epidemic  
• Author: A.A. Hoehling 
• Publisher: Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1961 




The foreignness of germs: the persistent association of imm
disease   in American society. Milbank Q. 2002;80(4):757-88.  
• PMID: 12532646 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]. Abstract available at 
http://PubMed.gov.  
This article discusses immigrants, and why they are stigmatized during times of national crisis. 
panning two generations, the information in the article suggests that the mistakes of the past S
must not be repeated.  
 
History of Pandemics – Expert Articles 
 
Steve Perry—Bird Flu: This Thing Just Continues to March . Interview with Osterholm, from 
oward Markel—The Flu Snafu—The Story Behind Strain A (H2N2), from The Globalist, 
 
Gina Kolata
 All the Wrong Places (11/8/05) 
• The 1918 Flu Killed Millions. Does it Hold Clues for Today? (3/28/06) 
How Serious is the Risk of Avian Flu? ( 3/27/06) 
 
CityPages, 3/22/06 
Howard Markel—The Iraq War and Global Public Health, from The Globalist, 4/21/03.  
H
4/18/05 
—New York Times 
• Genetic Material of Virus From 1918 Flu is Found (3/21/97) 
• Scientists Uncover Clues to Flu Epidemic of 1918 (2/16/99) 
• Experts Unlock Clues to Spread of 1918 Flu Virus (10/6/05) 
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rom FluLab.com—Bird Flu Report 10—1918 Spanish FluF
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=7423997674238499075
 














1918 Influenza Pandemic Special Report, Nature, October 05, 2005: 
http://www.nature.com/nature/focus/1918flu/index.html
 




xt Pandemic—article by Michael T. Osterholm, 2005: 
ttp://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050701faessay84402/michael-t-osterholm/preparing-for-the-




Influenza Pandemics of the 20th Century—article by Edwin D. Kilbourne, 2006: 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no01/05-1254.htm
 
The Influenza Pandemic of 1918—article by Molly Billings, June, 1997 modified February, 2005: 
http://www.stanford.edu/group/virus/uda/
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http://www.jhsph.edu/publichealthnews/magazine/archive/Mag_Fall04/prologues/index.html
 
The Coming Influenza Pandemic: Lessons from the Past for the Future—article by Michael M. 
atterson, November 2005: P
http://www.jaoa.org/cgi/content/full/105/11/498
 






The Spanish Influenza Outbreak1918—Sarah Cummings: 
http://history-world.org/spanish_influenza_of_1918.htm
 
Experts fear escape of 1918 flu from lab, New Scientist, October 21, 2004: 
http://www.prisonplanet.com/articles/october2004/211004fearescape.htm
 
There Wasn’t a Mine Runnin’ a Lump O’ Coal: A Kentucky Coal Miner Remembers the Influenza 
andemic of 1918-1919, University of Kentucky Oral History Project:  P
http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/107
 
Avian and Human Pandemic Influenza—Economic and Social Impacts, World Health 
rganization, November 8, 2005: O
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/events/2005/World_Bank_Milan_Brahmbhattv2.pdf
 
The Impact of Pandemic Influenza on Public Health—presentation by Rashid A. Chotani, Johns 





Global Health Council: 
http://www.globalhealth.org/
 
A Hunt for Life-Saving Lessons from a Grim Past, NPR: All Things Considered—story by 
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Appendix C: Probable Stakeholder Concerns List  
*List Based on Pandemic Phases and Possible Scenarios  
WHO PANDEMIC ALERT PHASES 3, 4, or 5 
Scenario 1: Wild Bird H5N1 Infection Discovered in U.S. 
 
1-1. What is bird flu? [messages drafted 110605] 
1-2. How certain are you about this information?  [messages drafted 110605] 
1-3. What is the worst-case scenario?  [messages drafted 110605] 
1-4. Are people in danger? 
1-5. What should people be doing now to prepare for the worst? 
1-6. What is being done to keep H5N1 from becoming human pandemic influenza? 
1-7. How can people protect themselves? 
1-8. What can we expect to happen next? 
1-9 What advice do you have for bird hunters? 
1-10. What advice do you have for people who have pet birds? 
1-11. What advice do you have for operators of commercial poultry flocks? 
1-11. What are the symptoms of bird flu in birds? 
1-12. What should a person do if they find a dead bird? 
1-13. Is this the start of a pandemic? 
1-14. What are you doing to protect commercial flocks? 
1-15. What is being done in response to what happened? 
1-16. What do you plan to do next to address this? 
1-17. Who is in charge? 
1-18. Who else is involved in the response? 
1-19. How did the bird get here? 
1-20. Do you expect to find more cases? 
1-21. Would you describe the situation as under control? 
1-22 What can I do to protect my family? 
1-23 What foods (meats) should I avoid? 
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WHO PANDEMIC ALERT PHASES 3, 4, or 5 
 
Scenario 2: Commercial Poultry H5N1 Infection Discovered in U.S. 
 
1-1. Are people in danger? 
1-2. What should people be doing now to prepare for the worst? 
1-3. What is being done to keep H5N1 from becoming human pandemic influenza? 
1-4. Is it safe to eat birds bought at stores? 
1-5. Is it safe to clean and eat wild birds? 
1-6. What can we expect to happen next? 
1-7 What advice do you have for bird hunters? 
1-8. What advice do you have for people who have pet birds? 
1-9. What advice do you have for operators of other commercial poultry flocks? 
1-10. What are the symptoms of bird flu in birds? 
1-11. What should a person do if they find a dead bird? 
1-12. Is this the start of a pandemic? 
1-13. What are you doing to protect other commercial flocks? 
1-14. What is being done in response to what happened? 
1-15. What do you plan to do next to address this? 
1-16. Who is in charge? 
1-17. Who else is involved in the response? 
1-18. How did the bird get the disease? 
1-19. Do you expect to find more flocks infected? 
1-20. Will people who have their flocks destroyed be reimbursed?  By whom? 
1-21. What is being done to protect poultry workers? 
1-22. Would you describe the situation as under control? 
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WHO PANDEMIC ALERT PHASES 3, 4, or 5 
 
Scenario 3a. Confirmed Human-to-Human Transmission of H5N1 Influenza Somewhere 
in the World 
 
The Disease 
D-1. Does this mean an influenza pandemic has started? 
D-2. How long will it take for this new virus to reach the U.S.? 
D-3. What is the worst-case scenario? 
D-4. How sure are you about this information? 
D-5. How is this different from the bird flu virus that’s been present? 
D-6. How is the disease transmitted from one person to another? 
D-7 Could this be a false alarm? 
D-8. Is this as bad as the 1918 influenza? 
D-9. How would this disease be likely to get to the U.S.? 
D-10. Could this have been prevented? 
 
Response 
R-1. What is being done to control the spread of the disease? 
R-2. What is HHS doing about this new form of the disease? 
R-3. What are other parts of the U.S. government doing about this new virus? 
R-4. What are other countries doing about this new virus? 
R-5. How effective do you expect the control measures to be? 
R-6. What will happen if control measures don’t work? 
R-7. What travel restrictions are you advising or ordering? 
R-8. Is a vaccine being made to protect people against this new virus? 
R-9. How long will it take before there is enough vaccine for everyone in the U.S.? 
R-10. What makes you think the control measures will work? 
R-11. Can this disease be treated? 
R-12. What laboratory testing is being done to confirm this new disease? 
R-13. What research is being done to study this new form of the virus? 
R-14. Are there adequate supplies of medicine to control the outbreak? 
R-15. How will supplies to control the outbreak get to the right place? 
R-16. What will you do if the control measures fail? 
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P-1. What is the U.S. government doing to prepare for the disease here? 
P-2. How prepared is the U.S. for emergence of this new form of the virus? 
P-3. How worried should people be? 
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WHO PANDEMIC ALERT PHASE 6 
 
Scenario 3b: Asian Influenza Outbreak in People—There are now hundreds of current, 
confirmed cases of a new influenza virus in an Asian country. 
 
3-1. Would you describe the situation as under control? [messages drafted 110605] 
3-2. How worried should people be?  [messages drafted 110605] 
3-3. What can we expect next?  [messages drafted 110605]  
3-4. What should people be doing now to prepare for the worst? 
3-5. Can people travel from the U.S. to Asia? 
3.6. Will you close the borders? 
3-7. What is being done to keep this disease out of the U.S.? 
3-8. What are the symptoms of this disease? 
3-9. What should someone do if they think they have this disease? 
3-10 Is this pandemic influenza? 
3-11. What is being done? 
3-12. What do you plan to do next to address this? 
3-13. Who is in charge? 
3-14. Who else is involved in the response? 
3-15. Do you expect this disease to get to people in the U.S.? 
3-16. What will you do if someone in the U.S. is diagnosed with this disease? 
3-17. What is being done about vaccine development and production for this disease? 
3-18. How are antiviral medicines being used in the U.S. now to address this? 
3-19. Will the U.S. provide antiviral medicines from the U.S. stockpile to the affected 
countries? 
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WHO PANDEMIC ALERT PHASE 6 
 
Scenario 4: General Transmission (WHO Phase 6.1) —There is increased and sustained 
transmission of a new influenza virus in the general population in the U.S. 
 
4-1. How much of our limited resources can we share? [messages drafted 110605]  
4-2. Overarching message [messages drafted 110605] 
4-3. What are you doing to protect your family? [messages drafted 110605] 
4-4. What should people know now? 
4-5. What should people be doing now? 
4-6. How long will this go on? 
4-7 How are you working to adjust your plan to the current circumstances? 
4-8. What can people do to protect themselves? 
4-9. What is the federal government doing to address the overwhelming of the health care 
system? 
4-10. How many people will get the disease in the U.S.?  How many will die? 
4-11. What are the current travel restrictions? 
4-12. What should someone do if they think they have this disease? 
4-13. What is being done? 
4-14. What do you plan to do next? 
4-15. Who is in charge? 
4-16. Who else is involved in the response? 
4-17. What is being done about a vaccine for this disease? 
4-18. Who is getting antiviral medicines? 
4-19. What support can you provide to states and cities? 
4-20. Could this have been prevented? 
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Appendix D: Audience Questions List 
Workshop audience members participated in moderated question and answer sessions with the 
panelists at the conclusion of each presentation. Themes to the questions emerged surrounding a 
pandemic event situation. The questions generated during the workshop are categorized below, 
and can be added to the initial “Probable Stakeholder Concerns List” referenced in Appendix C. 
 
WHO PANDEMIC ALERT PHASE 6 
 
Businesses 
B-1. Will the federal government provide assistance to businesses that suffer significant losses 
due to the pandemic? 
B-2. How will this affect businesses and daily functions in a community, and are there 
measures to counteract those affects? 
B-3. What is the threshold on absenteeism? 
 
Coordination and Communication 
CC-1. How is the federal government coordinating planning and response efforts? 
CC-2. How is communication/public information controlled on “blog” Web sites? 
CC-3. How can we address communication strategies internationally? 
 
Government Planning and Authority 
GA-1.  Who is in charge? 
GA-2. Who or which office in the federal government is the nearest to absolute authority about 
pandemic issues? 
GA-3. What universal criteria is/will be used to rank government activities so that a 
determination can be made to stop certain activities and determine the degree of risk 
present to employees? 
GA-4. Will there be government funding to aid in implementing these pandemic plans at the 
local level (i.e., local health departments)?  
GA-5. Has there been any research on which Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources (CI/KR) 
would be affected most by a pandemic? 
GA-6. What is the expectation of the public in terms of the response to pandemic flu from 








Pandemic Influenza – Past, Present, Future Workshop 
 
 D-2 October 17, 2006 
Healthcare 
H-1. How can I protect noninfected patients? 
H-2. How will pandemic flu affect emergency rooms for people with nonflu emergencies? 
H-3. What can be done to prepare emergency rooms, primary care providers, and first 
responders for a pandemic? How do we discover other critical personnel categories that 
need resources? 
 
General Pandemic Event 
GP-1. How long does flu last?  
GP-2.  How long am I contagious?  
GP-3. How does flu spread?  
GP-4. What is the recovery rate?  
GP-5. Is there an effective treatment? 
GP-6. How should I care for someone who is sick? 
GP-7. Who is most at risk for getting the flu? 
GP-8. How do we dispose of the dead? What should I do if I was around someone who died? 
GP-9. Where can I find information and guidelines about what to do? 
GP-10. How long will it take for government services to reach me? 
GP-11. How are essential services (police, firefighters, hospitals, postal service, government) 
going to continue functioning? 
GP-12. How will we know when the pandemic is in the United States? How will we know when 
it is over? 
 
Preparation and Protection 
PP-1. What can I do, both now and during a pandemic, to prepare and protect my family?  
PP-2. How much food and water should I have stored? How can I make sure my water is safe if 
chlorine runs out? Do I have to boil my water for all uses? 
PP-3. What can I do to reduce the chances of getting the flu? Will antibiotics or the seasonal flu 
shot help? 
PP-4. How do I disinfect my hands and other materials? 
PP-5. Should I stay home?  
PP-6. Will wearing a mask keep me safe? Will it keep others safe if I am infected? 
PP-7. Where do I go to get the vaccine or a mask? 
PP-8. How can we be a good neighbor but still stay safe? 
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PP-10. What should I do if I think I have the flu? 
PP-11. When, if at all, should I go to the doctor or emergency room?  
PP-12. How can I protect my staff? 
PP-13. How can I get more than 30 days of my prescriptions? 
 
Pets 
Pets-1. Is it safe to be around my pets?  
Pets-2. Can I catch it from them or give it to them?  
Pets-3. What do I do if my pet gets sick? 
 
Quarantine and Travel 
QT-1. Is the federal government preparing guidelines/recommendations for local and state 
governments for quarantines?  
QT-2. How will quarantines be coordinated between states?  
QT-3. How will areas get supplies during quarantines? 
QT-4. Is it safe to travel during a pandemic? What kind of precautions are being discussed? 
 
Schools and Children 
SC-1. Who makes the decisions that schools should be closed? How is it decided?  
SC-2. What should I do with my children if school closes? Who will take care of them? 
SC-3. Can the children still go out? Is it safe for them to play in the back yard? 
 
Social Distancing 
SD-1. Is social distancing sufficient to stopping the spread of a pandemic? 
SD-2. How long will social distancing be necessary? 
 
Special Populations and Services 
SP-1. What can senior citizens who live alone do during a pandemic? How do they prepare, 
stay aware of events, and get vaccinations?  
SP-2. Who will take care of people who live alone? 
SP-3. Who can help homeless people? 
SP-4. Where should a healthy pregnant woman give birth?   
SP-5. In the event of a pandemic, how safe are the prisoners, their guards, and visitors? 
SP-6. As a police officer, how can I safely arrest a symptomatic individual without getting sick 
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SP-7. Has there been an integration of mental health services?  
SP-8. Will mental health services be able to handle the surge? 
 
Vaccines 
V-1. How should the vaccine process be prioritized? Who will make the decision? Who will 
be given priority?  
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• ation to those economically challenged people 
• ibility, what can be done to 
opulations? 
• How do we keep xenophobia at bay? 
Questions to consider when developing and delivering messages: The following is a list of 
questions the audience members generated that they felt communicators should consider when 
conducting planning and message development activities. 
• How can government work with media to help reduce fears and maintain calmness? 
• How will we maintain trust when telling people they or their loved ones won’t get the 
antivirals, vaccine, hospital treatment, or respirators that are available?  
• How are guidelines and messages coordinated, and who will be the trusted authority 
to deliver them? 
• How can we educate the public so that they have trust in government but are also 
able to prepare for a pandemic? 
• How do we ensure that messaging to the public across the country is consistent and 
accurate? How do we counter rumors?  
• What should be the primary message going out now (prepandemic) to the general 
public regarding pandemic flu preparation?  
• How do we switch the message to cooperation during a pandemic, when resources 
will be in much shorter supply? 
• What are the key messages we should be relaying to the business community on how 
to prepare for a pandemic? 
• Given the lack of consensus on mitigation strategies and all the uncertainty about the 
long-term effectiveness of antivirals, what tools and advice should be given to the 
public?  
• How do you balance the uncertain nature of these answers with a clear message? 
How do we get the most basic inform
who require government services?  
To elevate the role of public health in terms of cred
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t you would like to see addressed in the future when 
ssaging. 
 roles of government levels. 
• s 
ons, women working outside the home, and the 
 etc. 
Appendix E: Audience Feedback 
Participants were asked to provide feedback about the workshop, in terms of what would be most 
helpful to them when continuing pandemic preparedness efforts. They were also asked to list 
additional topics they would like to see addressed in the future when discussing pandemic 
preparedness and were given an opportunity to provide additional comments. A representative 
summary of their responses follows. 
 
What topics were discussed today that will be most helpful to you when continuing your 
pandemic preparedness efforts? 
• The workshop highlighted some of the smaller issues (day-to-day activities) that were 
impacted by the pandemic. 
• I appreciated the historical perspective. 
• The comparison and contrast of society in 1918 and present. 
• The context on pandemics of the past was helpful.  
• The characteristics and communication that occurred during the first wave in 1918. 
• Learning about mortality rates from 1918 were helpful benchmarks to keep in mind 
in trying to imagine how a pandemic would affect life today. 
• How a pandemic will impact modern society. 
• The effects of influenza on the society, individuals, economy, and infrastructure. 
• The discussion concerning risk communication and the public’s trust in the 
government’s (both local and federal) response. 
 The discussion about coordinating messages and efforts. 
 
Please list some additional topics tha
discussing pandemic preparedness. 
• Mental health preparedness and psychological assistance. 
• Information on two-way communication, such as text me
• Notification procedures and
• Consistent key messaging. 
• Templates for action for smaller and less-staffed health departments. 
Having a speaker (maybe a sociologist) specifically address social issues such a
changes in volunteer organizati
implications for day care,
• Public education efforts. 
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will be impacted the most. 
ic. 
elopment and supply. 
Additio l
ive perspectives. 
th pertinent knowledge. 
• Thought-provoking! 
 
• Information on specific industries that 
• The role of media during a pandem
• Vaccine dev
 
na  Comments 
• Thank you. Excellent! 
• Good mix of presenters and different but cohes
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